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Th is article analyzes local government ﬁ scal sustainability 
as a common-pool resource (CPR) problem. Comparing 
the experiences of Los Angeles County, San Bernardino 
City, and San Bernardino County, California, the 
analysis applies a framework developed from three 
decades of CPR research to show the importance of six 
micro-situational variables—communications with the 
full set of participants, known reputations of participants, 
high marginal per capita return, entry or exit capabili-
ties, longer time horizon, and agreed-upon sanctioning 
capabilities—in shaping collective action dynamics and 
building the trust and reciprocity among stakeholders 
needed to achieve ﬁ scal sustainability. Th e underlying 
contextual conditions for these micro-situational variables 
vary based on speciﬁ c socioeconomic and political settings, 
but the ﬁ ndings suggest that institutions and processes can 
be designed based on several well-tested principles in CPR 
governance to encourage stakeholders to look beyond their 
immediate self-interests and make decisions that account 
for the community’s long-term ﬁ scal sustainability.
Fiscal sustainability has become and will con-tinue to be a major challenge for local govern-ments in the United States. As forecast by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃ  ce (2013), 
operating deﬁ cits for state and local governments 
will increase and continue for decades. Reduced tax 
revenues resulting from demographic changes will 
also create budgetary stresses for governments at all 
levels, and these stresses will 
continue for decades (Pisano 
2013b). Confronting these 
ﬁ scal sustainability challenges 
requires coordinated eﬀ orts 
among multiple actors in the 
local community, both inside 
and outside government, to 
refashion institutions, budgetary 
processes, and core assumptions about ways for fund-
ing and delivering local public services. As evidenced 
by a number of highly visible municipal bankruptcy 
cases in the recent past, including the cities of Detroit, 
Michigan, and San Bernardino, California, if this 
trend continues, many more cities around the country 
may face the prospect of chronic ﬁ scal imbalance and, 
perhaps, bankruptcy in the future. In the current 
public ﬁ nance and budgeting literature, many quan-
titative studies link various institutional, political, 
and socioeconomic variables to local ﬁ scal decisions, 
mostly based on cross-sectional data at a given point 
in time; yet few qualitative studies provide detailed 
and over-time analyses of the processes and mecha-
nisms by which local stakeholders may gradually 
overcome collective action problems to develop ﬁ scal 
sustainability.
In this article, we analyze local government ﬁ scal 
sustainability as a common-pool resource (CPR) 
problem. Originally developed to examine natural 
resource governance issues, the CPR perspective is 
well suited to studying public sector ﬁ scal sustain-
ability issues because they share similar collective 
action problems (Feiock and Scholz 2010). A long 
tradition of academic research on CPRs has adopted 
a case study approach (Ostrom 1990). Similarly, we 
draw on our three-year, in-depth case study research 
and apply the framework from ﬁ ndings in the CPR 
literature to explain the results of in-depth case studies 
of three local jurisdictions—Los Angeles County, San 
Bernardino City, and San Bernardino County—con-
ducted between 2011 and 2013.
Many ﬁ scal challenges currently 
facing state and local jurisdic-
tions in the United States 
resemble the classic tragedy of 
the commons, a situation in 
which most users understand 
that the existing way of using 
the CPR will eventually lead to 
its ruin, but no one is willing to 
reduce one’s use or contribute to its replenishment if 
no credible means exists to overcome the inherent col-
lective action problems. CPRs have two basic charac-
teristics: diﬃ  culty of excluding potential beneﬁ ciaries 
and subtractability of use (Ostrom 2005). Because of 
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We then analyze the case of San Bernardino City, which declared 
bankruptcy in 2012. Th e third case is San Bernardino County, 
which illustrates possible ways of averting a ﬁ scal crisis through 
concerted eﬀ orts by the key stakeholders. Th e next section links the 
cases to well-established theories about the interactive dynamics 
and institutional design variables that characterize sustainable CPR 
governance. Th e ﬁ nal section draws conclusions about the utility of 
the CPR framework for studying and facilitating ﬁ scal sustainability.
Fiscal Institutional Factors
In an overview of the extant literature on the political economy 
of ﬁ scal institutions, Von Hagen (2006) identiﬁ es three general 
types of institutional arrangements—ex ante ﬁ scal rules, electoral 
rules, and the budgetary process—that can potentially address the 
CPR problems inherent in public ﬁ nance and budgeting. First, ex 
ante ﬁ scal rules—such as balanced budget requirements, numeri-
cal debt ceilings, and preset limits on the growth of taxation and 
spending—can limit the growth of public expenditure. A common 
drawback of such rules, however, is that decision makers can often 
circumvent them and, in the process, produce unintended negative 
consequences. For example, balanced budget requirements may 
create incentives for decision makers to look at the short term while 
neglecting the long-term problems created by short-term ﬁ xes, such 
as delayed maintenance on critical infrastruc-
tures, shifting ﬁ nancial obligations to future 
generations, and others (Bifulco et al. 2012).
Second, electoral rules shape elected oﬃ  cials’ 
preferences for ﬁ scal allocation. As shown 
by Baqir (2002), for example, after controlling for other possible 
determinates, U.S. municipal governments with larger numbers of 
legislators tend to have higher public spending per capita because 
individual legislators are motivated to make spending proposals that 
beneﬁ t their own constituencies. Such an eﬀ ect is mitigated in cities 
that have a strong-mayor form of government, but the eﬀ ect is not 
aﬀ ected by whether the legislators are elected at-large or from indi-
vidual districts. Th e results, however, leave open the question as to 
whether some communities may have adopted a strong-mayor form 
of government as a way to control public spending in the ﬁ rst place.
Th ird, the budgetary process matters. For example, it is often 
posited that a more centralized budgetary process, coupled with 
transparency, encourages all participants to resolve their compet-
ing claims on the budget in a coordinated manner (Peterson 1995). 
Yet how the budgetary process can be centralized and made more 
transparent is contingent on the underlying institutional structures. 
For example, in a strong-mayor form of municipal government, the 
mayor’s oﬃ  ce can be the focal point for negotiating and implement-
ing budgetary deals. In municipal governments in which the heads 
of major departments are independently elected, diﬀ erent forums 
and mechanisms for budget negotiation and implementation may 
be needed.
A Collective Action Perspective
Th ese three types of ﬁ scal design are important, yet by themselves 
they do not fully explain why some communities are more success-
ful than others in confronting major ﬁ scal challenges. First of all, 
diﬀ erent factors work together in a conﬁ gurative way; for example, 
diﬀ erent combinations of ex ante ﬁ scal rules and electoral rules 
these two basic characteristics, many CPRs are susceptible to col-
lective action problems in relation to provision and appropriation. 
Provision problems relate to the types of eﬀ orts needed to maintain 
a resource’s long-term productive (i.e., supply) capacity; appropria-
tion problems relate to collective eﬀ orts needed to limit appropria-
tion of (i.e., demand for) resource units in order to maintain the 
resource system’s sustainable yield in the long run.
Public sector ﬁ scal decisions resemble CPR problems. As suggested 
by Von Hagen, “At the heart of the common-pool problem of pub-
lic ﬁ nances is an externality that results from using general tax funds 
to ﬁ nance targeted public policies” (2006, 470). In other words, 
government revenues are pooled together from diverse sources; 
the costs of public expenditures are generally paid for by the entire 
political jurisdiction, while the beneﬁ ts of speciﬁ c government 
expenditures tend to be concentrated among speciﬁ c groups (Baqir 
2002; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). Th us, each group (and 
its political representatives) wants to get a larger share of the com-
mon revenue pool. Th ose who beneﬁ t from each speciﬁ c program 
prefer a budgetary allocation that is higher than the socially optimal 
level. But if every group tries to maximize its share, the collective 
outcome will be excessive public spending, unsustainable deﬁ cits, or 
ﬁ scal crisis.
A balanced and sustainable budget beneﬁ ts 
everyone in the community. If the exist-
ing institutions and processes for allocating 
ﬁ scal resources for diﬀ erent purposes can no 
longer provide for a sustainable and economi-
cally sound budget, no one wants to accept cutbacks unilaterally. 
Everyone, however, is potentially worse oﬀ  if the political jurisdic-
tion faces long-term budgetary shortfalls, bankruptcy, or other 
major operational disruptions. Th e collective action problems that 
participants face in their eﬀ orts to restructure the institutions and 
processes for ﬁ scal decision making constitute a second-order pris-
oner’s dilemma. Collective action problems are especially serious 
during major economic downturns; as funds become increasingly 
scarce, stakeholders are more motivated to ﬁ ght to preserve their 
own share of the budget, disregarding the impact on the jurisdic-
tion’s long-term ﬁ scal health. Th e classic tragedy of the commons 
occurs when short-term imperatives—for example, resolving col-
lective bargaining through the deferral of costs—deplete available 
resources in the long term. Nonetheless, the tragedy of the com-
mons is not necessarily immutable if stakeholders believe that there 
are credible means of increasing revenue sources or of sharing the 
pains of budgetary cuts equitably and that they will be better oﬀ  in 
the long run by supporting short-term belt-tightening and altering 
their operational strategies. Drawing on the comparison of three 
case studies, this article shows how theoretical postulates derived 
from the CPR research regarding interactive dynamics and institu-
tional design principles help explain the success or failure of local 
governments in addressing ﬁ scal commons dilemmas.
To set the stage for our three-case comparison, we provide an over-
view of the extant literature on the political economy of ﬁ scal insti-
tutions, followed by an initial discussion of the analytical leverage 
provided by approaching ﬁ scal challenges as CPR problems. Th is is 
followed by an analysis of the case of Los Angeles County, mostly in 
terms of how the case aligns with the ﬁ ndings in the CPR literature. 
A balanced and sustainable 
budget beneﬁ ts everyone in the 
community.
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variety of CPRs—irrigation systems, groundwater basins, ﬁ sheries, 
forests, and others—Ostrom and associates identify a number of 
contextual variables related to the resource system, resource units, 
governance system, and users that are most likely to impact CPR 
users’ chances of overcoming resource use dilemmas (Blomquist, 
Schlager, and Heikkila 2004; Lam 1998; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker 1994; Schlager and Heikkila 2011; Tang and 
Tang 2001; Tang 1991, 1992), with additional research applying the 
CPR framework to regional and federal governance (Callahan 2007; 
Feiock 2013; Feiock and Scholz 2010).
As argued by Ostrom (2005), no deﬁ nite sets of operational and 
collective choice rules can be the magic bullet for resolving CPR 
problems in all circumstances. Rather, it is by careful experimenta-
tion that CPR users can work together to develop a governance 
system that ﬁ ts the resource system, resource units, and users 
of their speciﬁ c CPR. In this respect, eight institutional design 
principles, as originally presented in Ostrom (1990) and further 
reﬁ ned later in Ostrom (2005), have remained a useful guide for 
linking the six micro-situational variables to the contextual vari-
ables that explain successful CPR governance. Th e eight principles 
are (1) clearly deﬁ ned boundaries, (2) proportional equivalence 
between beneﬁ ts and costs, (3) collective choice arrangements, 
(4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conﬂ ict-resolution 
mechanisms, (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize, and 
(8) nested enterprises.1
Th is list of principles goes beyond the ﬁ scal rules, electoral rules, 
and budgetary processes that were identiﬁ ed as critical institutional 
factors aﬀ ecting ﬁ nancial CPR problems. Instead, the list highlights 
the importance of institutional arrangements, both formal and 
informal, that take into account the interactive dynamics among the 
resource system, resource units, and users of a CPR.
Th ese principles are not blueprints but can be seen as “structural 
similarities” among robust, long-serving CPR systems (Ostrom 
2005, 257). Th ey can also be viewed as guidelines for designing 
institutions that support the six micro-situational processes con-
ducive to the resolution of CPR problems. Although these eight 
principles have been shown repeatedly to be useful guidelines 
for designing robust institutions for CPRs in the natural world, 
a key question is how many of them may be directly relevant for 
other types of CPRs, as in the case of the ﬁ scal commons, which 
involves not only collective action problems parallel to those preva-
lent in natural CPRs but also some of its own unique problems. 
Understanding the applicability of these principles will add to the 
current public ﬁ nance literature; it may also help us resolve the puz-
zle regarding the endogenous and conﬁ gurative eﬀ ects of institu-
tional variables on public ﬁ nancial decisions.
In this article, we apply Ostrom’s insights into micro-situational 
variables and institutional design principles for robust CPR govern-
ance to examine what accounts for the divergent ﬁ scal performance 
of three local jurisdictions in California: Los Angeles County, San 
Bernardino City, and San Bernardino County. Developing in-depth 
case studies to address complex problems allowed Ostrom’s CPR 
research to “examine the factors that appeared to account for the 
robustness of some systems and the failures of others” (Ostrom 
2006, 5). Similarly, the case study research design in this project 
may favor diﬀ erent types of budgetary processes. A related question 
concerns the possible endogeneity of institutions—that is, on the one 
hand, ﬁ scal and electoral rules condition the budgetary process, while 
on the other hand, diﬀ erent ﬁ scal and electoral rules may themselves 
be results of eﬀ orts to improve the budgetary process. In addition, to 
be viable tools, institutional arrangements must be self-enforcing in 
the long run, that is, participants must have self-motivated reasons to 
abide by them if they expect other participants to do the same (Greif 
2006; Knight and Johnson 2011; Tang 2012). What conditions are 
conducive to the establishment and maintenance of institutions for 
ensuring ﬁ scal sustainability in local governments?
Ideas for tackling these diﬃ  cult issues can be found in the broader 
literature on CPR governance. Ostrom (2005) argues that CPR 
problems cannot be eﬀ ectively resolved by cookie-cutter methods 
or by simply drawing on the traditional research methods focused 
on the study of either “the state” or “the market.” In many circum-
stances, locally developed solutions that are neither state nor market 
driven are better suited to the underlying ecological, socioeconomic, 
and governance contexts, suggesting the need for institutional 
diversity in addressing varied CPR situations. Yet one cannot go to 
the extreme by claiming that each situation is unique and requires 
an entirely diﬀ erent solution; if so, no systematic scholarly work 
on the subject would be possible. CPR research, as with public 
administration research, has been advanced through interdisciplinary 
frameworks (Raadschelders 2011). Speciﬁ cally, one needs to (1) 
understand the typical situations participants ﬁ nd themselves in rela-
tion to CPR problems, (2) analyze the “micro-situational” conditions 
that are conducive to participants resolving their CPR problems, and 
(3) develop general frameworks (or models) that can identify major 
factors and how these factors may combine to aﬀ ect the ways partici-
pants interact with one another in diﬀ erent CPR situations.
As argued by Ostrom (1990, 2010), for users to successfully manage 
a CPR in the long run, they need to develop trust and reciprocal 
relationships with each other, learning how to work together to 
develop and enforce an appropriate set of rules that will help them 
overcome various types of commons dilemmas related to provi-
sion and appropriation issues. Extensive experimental research has 
been conducted in the past three decades to examine the micro-
situational conditions under which participants in social dilemma 
settings are likely to cooperate with each other to produce mutually 
beneﬁ cial outcomes. As summarized by Ostrom (2010, 661–62), 
these ﬁ ndings include the following:
• Communication is feasible with the full set of participants
• Reputations of participants are known
• High marginal per capita return for participants in successful 
collective eﬀ orts
• Entry or exit capabilities for key participants so that no one 
will be taken for granted
• Longer time horizon
• Agreed-upon sanctioning capabilities
Because these results were derived from experimental research, for 
them to be useful as policy and management tools, they need to 
be mapped onto speciﬁ c contextual attributes—speciﬁ c features of 
the resource system, resource units, users, and governance system. 
Based on more than three decades of in-depth ﬁ eld research on a 
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six micro-situational variables. Next we summarize lessons from the 
three cases by examining them in the context of eight questions on 
institutional design principles.
The Exemplary Practices of Los Angeles County
With a population of close to 10 million, Los Angeles County is the 
largest county in the United States. Th e county is highly diverse, 
with minorities accounting for more than 50 percent of the popula-
tion. With more than 100,000 employees, the county government 
provides direct municipal services to almost a million people who 
live in the unincorporated area (outside the 88 incorporated cities in 
the county), in addition to providing the usual county-level services 
such as public assistance, public safety, health and human services, 
and transportation.
Like other counties in California, Los Angeles County’s revenue-
generating power is highly constrained, especially since passage of 
Proposition 13 in the 1980s, which has severely limited the ability 
of local jurisdictions to raise revenues through tax increases without 
two-thirds voter approval. Since Proposition 13, larger amounts of 
local revenues have been redirected through the state. Th e overall 
ﬁ scal situation in Los Angeles County in the past three decades has 
been one of reduced discretion coupled with constrained revenues 
and increasing service needs. Despite this challenging environment, 
Los Angeles County has been relatively successful in maintaining 
ﬁ scal sustainability. In the face of the recent economic downturn, 
the county has managed to maintain the following bond ratings: 
Moody’s MIG 1, Standard & Poor’s SP 1+, and Fitch’s F1+.
Several contextual and incidental factors—structural features, criti-
cal events, the budgetary process, and labor relations—are relevant 
for understanding why Los Angeles has been able to maintain ﬁ scal 
sustainability.
Structural Features
Th e county is governed by a board of ﬁ ve supervisors, who tradition-
ally had long tenure, with many of them serving continuously for 
decades. Term limits of three consecutive four-year terms were 
approved by voters in 2002. Because the provision was not retroac-
tive, several long-serving supervisors are still in the board, with their 
terms scheduled to expire in the next few years. Th e long tenure of 
the county supervisors encouraged the board members to adopt a 
relatively conservative approach to budgeting, as they realized the 
likelihood of facing the negative consequences created by current ﬁ s-
cal mistakes many years later. In Los Angeles County, the supervisors 
are highly involved in the budgetary process, and this helps translate 
their more conservative approach to ﬁ scal matters into actual 
practices.
In the past two decades, the board of supervisors has gradually given 
the chief administrative oﬃ  cer more power. Traditionally, the county 
government had a stovepiped and fragmented administrative struc-
ture, with each supervisor overseeing a range of departments, thus 
making it diﬃ  cult for departments to coordinate with each other. 
Such a fragmented structure was gradually reintegrated by the strong 
leadership of a succession of well-respected chief administrative oﬃ  c-
ers since the 1980s continuing to today. In 2007, the board changed 
the administrative system from a chief administrative oﬃ  cer (CAO) 
model to a chief executive oﬃ  cer (CEO) model. In the current CEO 
facilitates an in-depth comparison of jurisdictions successfully 
sustaining their ﬁ scal commons with a jurisdiction that ﬁ led for 
bankruptcy. Th is research design addresses the “how” question of 
explaining how diﬀ erences emerge, which is a particular strength 
of case study research (Yin 1994). Additionally, case study research 
design addresses the nuanced questions of governance (Heinrich, 
Hill, and Lynn 2004).
Th e case studies were conducted mainly through interviews with 
key stakeholders between 2011 and 2013. More than 10 interviews 
were conducted in each city. Most of the interviews lasted more than 
one hour, and the interviewees were ensured anonymity. For most 
interviews, we used a set of questions that we prepared ahead of time 
to ensure that we covered all the main issues we wanted to learn 
from the interviewee. Additional questions were raised during the 
interview based on the interviewee’s initial responses to the prepared 
questions. Interviewees in each case included key elected oﬃ  cials 
(including board, council, and committee members and chairs), 
chief administrative oﬃ  cers, department heads, staﬀ s of elected oﬃ  -
cials, leaders of charter revision commissions, labor leaders, and busi-
ness and community leaders. We also consulted secondary sources, 
including newspaper reports, documents from bond rating agencies, 
oﬃ  cial Web sites, and oﬃ  cial planning and budgeting documents. 
Expert panels of researchers and experienced practitioners in local 
government reviewed the case studies over a three-year period to 
check for accuracy and to comment on the case descriptions.
As the details for each case study have already been published 
(Callahan and Pisano 2014; Pisano and Callahan 2012, 2013a), this 
article provides only a brief sketch of each and instead focuses on 
comparing lessons from the cases. Two levels of analysis—one at the 
micro-situational level and the other at the institutional design level—
are used in our comparison.
At the micro-situational level, we focus on the interactive dynam-
ics among key ﬁ scal stakeholders in the local jurisdictions; speciﬁ -
cally, we use Ostrom’s six micro-situational conditions identiﬁ ed in 
experimental settings to examine how stakeholders and leaders in the 
three jurisdictions diﬀ er in how they interact with each other in ﬁ scal 
decision processes. Diﬀ erences in these micro-situational dynamics 
help us make sense of how varying dynamics contribute to diﬀ erent 
ﬁ scal behaviors and outcomes. Diﬀ erent from the aggregate measure-
ments used in quantitative studies on similar topics, information that 
we gathered from in-depth interviews with stakeholders in each case 
allows us to lay out in greater detail the underlying mechanisms of 
these situational dynamics.
Next, we draw on Ostrom’s questions regarding the practical appli-
cation of her eight design principles for sustainable CPR govern-
ance and use them as a template for relaying micro-situational 
dynamics to institutional design issues. As will be shown in the 
subsequent discussion in this article, these principles do not point 
to any speciﬁ c set of political structures as a prerequisite for ﬁ scal 
sustainability, but they do highlight crucial institutional variables, 
both formal and informal, that are important for sustaining the 
local ﬁ scal commons.
In the rest of this article, we ﬁ rst brieﬂ y outline each case. Th en we 
examine how the three cases match or mismatch each of Ostrom’s 
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pension program with reduced beneﬁ ts for newer hires. In the 
1990s, the county, following the budgetary principles identiﬁ ed 
earlier, was able to resist the political pressure prevalent in California 
at the time to adopt new beneﬁ ts packages for all public employees, 
including the provision for calculating pension beneﬁ ts based on 3 
percent of salary per year served with retirement at age 55, which in 
recent years has turned out to be a major source of ﬁ nancial head-
ache for many other government jurisdictions in California. Th e 
county administration has built a level of trust with the unions by 
virtue of its ability to maintain a ﬁ scally sound budget and pension 
system and to make salary and beneﬁ t adjustments that are appro-
priate for the economic conditions overtime.
The Bankruptcy of San Bernardino City
With a population of approximately 200,000, San Bernardino City 
is the seventeenth-largest city in California. In ﬁ scal year 2012, the 
city reported a $45 million deﬁ cit on a projected budget of $65 
million, with reserves depleted (Shanforth and Lawson 2013). With 
a projected debt of $240 million (including $47 million in pension 
obligations) and continuing deﬁ cits in the coming years, the city 
council declared bankruptcy under chapter 9 in July 2012. It was 
the largest municipal bankruptcy in the United States at the time, 
before Detroit took the title in 2013.
Th e ﬁ ling contrasted dramatically with the All-America City Award 
it received from the National Civic League in 1978. For several dec-
ades before the 1980s, San Bernardino was one of the fastest-grow-
ing areas in the region. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the 
city began to lose jobs, as several major employers, including Kaiser 
Health Care System and Norton Air Force Base, closed. Th e city’s 
economy also suﬀ ered as a result of the regional development pat-
tern, which shifted commercial and entertainment activities to the 
nearby cities of Ontario and Rancho Cucamonga, about 15 miles 
west of San Bernardino City. Th e housing market collapse since the 
Great Recession further undermined the local economy by eliminat-
ing many residential construction jobs. More than 70 percent of 
city residents are renters, with the majority of the property owners 
residing outside the city.
Structural Features
Established as a charter city in 1906, San Bernardino has a seven-
member council elected by district. Th e mayor, attorney, clerk, and 
treasurer are elected. Elected citywide, the mayor has extensive pow-
ers, with the majority of the staﬀ  reporting to him or her. Although 
the mayor sits on the council, he or she does not have a vote. Th e 
mayor has veto power over council decisions, but vetoes can be 
overridden by a supermajority vote of the council. In the past four 
decades, there has been a succession of several relatively long-serving 
mayors. Th e mayor and council members are subject to term limits.
As the only elected oﬃ  cial not subject to term limits, the city 
attorney has played a central role in policy making and operations, 
as the city charter accords the city attorney the exclusive author-
ity to interpret the charter. Th e previous city attorney had served 
six terms since 1987 and was only recently defeated for reelec-
tion in November 2013. Th e city attorney’s involvement in policy 
and operational issues has created considerable conﬂ icts between 
the oﬃ  ce of the mayor and that of the city attorney. Th e conﬂ icts 
became so intense that a past mayor requested and obtained a 
model, the CEO selects the department heads (with approval by the 
board), who report to the CEO for budgeting and coordination 
except for those elected countywide, such as the sheriﬀ .
Critical Events
Th e path to ﬁ scal sustainability in Los Angeles has involved several 
critical events. Th e ﬁ rst event occurred during the national reces-
sion of 1988–92. During that period, Orange County declared 
bankruptcy, and Los Angeles County was under close scrutiny by 
its lenders. Credit Suisse, a major lender to the county, requested a 
conference call during a regular board meeting on a Tuesday morn-
ing. Th e supervisors felt compelled to adjourn the board meeting 
and took the call. Th is event helped strengthen the supervisors’ 
resolve for greater ﬁ scal discipline. During the early 1990s, however, 
the supervisors had yet to turn their resolve into actual discipline 
because they lacked the organizational culture, administrative struc-
ture, and communication processes to carry it out.
In 1997, CAO David Janssen, who had taken oﬃ  ce the previous 
year, inherited an $800 million budget deﬁ cit and was presented 
with four competing budget proposals from the supervisors. To deal 
with the situation, Janssen introduced a more disciplined budgetary 
process and successfully negotiated a renewal of billions of dollars 
of federal waivers for the county hospital system. Janssen’s actions 
led to sustained budget balances in the following decade. Upon 
Janssen’s retirement in 2007, Bill Fujioka took over as the new CEO 
with enhanced powers. Th e county faced budget shortfalls during 
the recession of 2008–09 but was able to implement new measures 
in supply chain management, achieve budget reductions without 
layoﬀ s, and maintain the county’s credit ratings.
Budgetary Process
With the support of the board of supervisors, Janssen gradually 
developed a budgetary process based on procedures to ensure 
transparency, consistent information ﬂ ows across departments, and 
integration through a single point of coordination, with presenta-
tion of all relevant information and options for the supervisors’ 
consideration and avoidance of creating sensational political issues 
through freewheeling leaks to the press. Gradually, these open and 
transparent procedures helped create and sustain an organizational 
culture that supported the principles of (1) need-based instead of 
allocation-based budgeting; (2) conservative practices that included 
counting budget revenues that are agreed upon and that will 
continue beyond the current year, while excluding one-time funds 
that force ongoing or open-ended commitments in the operating 
budget; and (3) linking performance and eﬃ  ciency evaluation to the 
budgetary process.
Th ese budgetary principles were further reinforced by (1) long-
serving supervisors being ﬂ uent in ﬁ scal matters and highly engaged 
with the CAO/CEO in the budgetary process, (2) strategic planning 
processes involving coordinated participation from departments, 
(3) transparent and orderly ﬂ ows of information from a staﬀ  with 
highly developed professional skills in budgeting, and (4) the board 
and staﬀ  working closely to confront various ﬁ scal crises.
Labor Relations
Over the past three decades, the county was able to negotiate with 
the unions to adjust the pension system, which is now a six-tier 
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groups that could moderate these eﬀ orts. Many of the active civic 
groups that helped the city earn the All-America City Award back 
in 1978 are no longer active.
Averting Financial Crises in San Bernardino County
In terms of government structures and functions, San Bernardino 
County is similar to Los Angeles County. With a population of 
more than 2 million, San Bernardino County has a ﬁ ve-member 
board of supervisors elected by district. In addition to making 
legislative decisions, the supervisors possess executive powers in 
hiring and ﬁ ring senior administrative staﬀ  and overseeing county 
departments. Historically, supervisors were eager to protect the 
ﬁ nancial interests of their respective districts, with few incentives for 
engaging in priority setting across districts. Similar to Los Angeles 
County, San Bernardino is vulnerable to state transfers and funding. 
As cities in the region faced economic downturns, San Bernardino 
County had to face extra ﬁ nancial burdens in taking up the slack 
in public safety, redevelopment, and other services.
Being in the same region, San Bernardino County experienced simi-
lar economic pressures faced by San Bernardino City—reductions in 
property tax and sales tax revenues, increased unemployment, and 
residents leaving because of unaﬀ ordable mortgages. In addition to 
external economic forces, many political problems have historically 
plagued the county government. Th e local and regional press regu-
larly ran articles featuring the cumbersome administrative structure 
and ineﬃ  cient operations of the county government. Th e county 
was also known for its dysfunctional political culture, including 
corruption charges and convictions of an elected supervisor and 
staﬀ  members for violating state law, as well as large legal judgments 
against the county awarded to developers.
When the Great Recession hit, the county was in an uncertain 
ﬁ nancial condition. During the 2009 budget cycle, for example, the 
county ran an $80 million deﬁ cit, which was subsequently rolled 
into the following year. Th e structural deﬁ cit in the county devel-
oped from failures to account for the full costs of capital projects 
and collective bargaining agreements with county employees, 
county agreements to provide services for other local jurisdictions 
without charging for the full overhead costs, and a lack of coordina-
tion across departments in making budget decisions.
A window of opportunity opened up when two new supervi-
sors were elected in 2008. Chaired by Garry Ovitt, former mayor 
of Ontario, California, the new board subsequently hired Greg 
Devereaux, who had been the city manager of Ontario, as chief 
executive oﬃ  cer. Devereaux negotiated a ﬁ ve-year employment 
contract with the board, which gave his oﬃ  ce central authority 
to oversee and coordinate activities across all departments in the 
county. Instead of reporting directly to each supervisor separately, 
all department heads now report to Devereaux. Th is change helped 
facilitate priority setting across departments and geographic districts 
in the county. It also allowed the development and implementation 
of budget priorities and expense reductions to enhance the long-
term ﬁ scal health of the county.
Th e chief executive oﬃ  ce developed an integrated ﬁ nance track-
ing system across all departments. Each department must include 
estimates of the full allocation of overhead administrative expenses, 
restraining order on the city attorney. A city administrator tradition-
ally headed the administrative system. Th e system was changed to 
a city manager form in 2006, with enhanced powers to oversee city 
department heads.
Th e city has used the charter to set operational and budgetary policies. 
Section 186 of the charter ties salary increases for police oﬃ  cers and 
ﬁ reﬁ ghters to the average increase in public safety units in 10 speciﬁ c 
California cities, most of which are located in the more prosperous 
Orange County and the San Francisco Bay area. Th e result has been 
automatic increases that have outpaced the city’s ﬁ scal capacity.
Critical Events
In addition to charter provisions for automatic salary adjustments, 
the city council approved in 2004 a pension program for public 
safety personnel, in which pension payments are based on 3 percent 
for each year of service with retirement eligible from the age of 50. 
In addition, health coverage continues until the retiree becomes 
eligible for Medicare. At the time of the bankruptcy ﬁ ling, the state 
pension system, CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System), was listed as the “largest single creditor at more than $140 
million,” with the CalPERS legal ﬁ ling asserting that “the city was 
trying to improperly renege on its pension debts” (Walters 2012).
Several years before ﬁ ling for bankruptcy, the city council did try to 
improve the city’s operational and ﬁ nancial management by chang-
ing the city administrator position to a city manger position, giving 
the latter position more enhanced authority over city departments. 
Experienced professionals were brought in to ﬁ ll the city manager 
position. Nationally known facilitators were brought in to help 
organize policy retreats to consider strategies to revamp the city’s 
cost structure. Th ese eﬀ orts provided some momentum for change 
but subsequently gave way to the prevailing city politics (which will 
be further explained below). In 2012, the city’s ﬁ nancial plight was 
compounded when the state governor and legislature eliminated 
redevelopment agencies throughout the state, resulting in the use of 
operating revenues to oﬀ set staﬀ  costs.
Budgetary Process
Th e exchange between the city attorney and the mayor in the July 2012 
council meeting—accusing each other of not knowing the city’s true 
ﬁ scal condition—was symptomatic of a lack of collaboration among 
the city’s key institutional actors in the budgetary process. A lack of 
collaboration, together with charter provisions guaranteeing highly 
generous pay raises and pension beneﬁ ts to public safety oﬃ  cers, has 
made it diﬃ  cult for the city to adjust its ﬁ nancial choices in response 
to changing economic situations and state polices. Although the mayor 
and city manager attempted to introduce a more coordinated approach 
to budgeting, their eﬀ orts failed to turn the situation around.
Labor Relations
Th e public safety unions for police and ﬁ re are well organized. Less 
than 10 percent of the 100-plus uniformed members live inside 
the city. Th e public safety unions are politically active, and they 
are known to be eﬀ ective in handing electoral defeat to council 
members who advocated for change in pension policy. Th e unions 
advocated for increasing compensation adjustments and strength-
ening the authority of the city attorney in charter amendments. 
Nonetheless, there were no other organized eﬀ orts by other civic 
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businesses—who are willing to support not just their own interests 
but also the long-term interests of the community. Th e importance 
of such “community maintenance” (Gardner 1996) eﬀ orts is illus-
trated by the case of San Bernardino City, which deteriorated from 
being a National Civic League All-America City in 1978 to declar-
ing bankruptcy in 2012. External economic forces have played a 
signiﬁ cant role undermining the ﬁ scal condition in San Bernardino 
City; elected leaders in the city have tried to take steps to avert a 
ﬁ nancial disaster. Th eir eﬀ orts failed mainly because of their inabil-
ity to develop a facilitative framework for overcoming the collective 
action problems inherent in the CPR problems they faced.
San Bernardino County has faced similar challenges as those faced 
by San Bernardino City. Elected leaders in San Bernardino County 
took advantage of a window of opportunity by forging a new 
majority on the board that sought to change the decision dynam-
ics by hiring a seasoned chief executive. To 
foster changes, sustained eﬀ orts are needed to 
involve stakeholders and build the process and 
stable expectations among stakeholders for 
reconciling their short- and long-term inter-
ests in budgeting decisions. But it remains to 
be seen whether such eﬀ orts can be main-
tained in the long run.
At the most general level, as argued by 
Ostrom, the key to resolving CPR dilemmas 
is to develop trust and reciprocity among participants. To operation-
alize this general argument, one must identify the impact of speciﬁ c 
contexts on the formation or destruction of trust and reciprocity. 
Ostrom’s micro-situational variables characterize a type of context 
that can facilitate the development of interactive dynamics support-
ing trust and reciprocity among participants. Table 1 summarizes 
how the three cases align with the six micro-situational variables.
and budgets presented to the board must include a 10-year expendi-
ture forecast. Th e CEO and board created greater transparency and 
encouraged the identiﬁ cation of cost savings measures across depart-
ments and supervisory districts in the county. Th is also led to more 
eﬀ ective uses of federal community development block grant funds 
based on highest need on a countywide basis, instead of a mechanical 
split among the supervisorial districts, as had been the case in the past.
Th e 10-year forecast informed collective bargaining across 16 sepa-
rate negotiations, leading to agreements to multiple tiers of pension 
beneﬁ ts, reduced county matches to pension funds, and reduced 
annual salary increase increments. Strategic planning processes were 
convened with the participation of county oﬃ  cials, city oﬃ  cials, 
civic leaders, and regional planning agency oﬃ  cials to consider 
(1) long-term strategic allocation of ﬁ nancial and environmental 
resources for the region and (2) possible ways of leveraging resources 
from multiple jurisdictions for operating 
existing resources, such as parks and water 
resources, for greater cost eﬀ ectiveness and 
more sustainable uses. Th ese eﬀ orts have 
enabled the county to continue operations 
without declaring bankruptcy, but the county 
is not without continuing ﬁ scal stress. While 
the county maintains a Moody MIG-1 rating 
as a whole, its pension obligation bonds have 
been downgraded.
Linking the Three Cases to the Six Micro-Situational 
Variables and Questions on Design Principles
Th e case of Los Angeles County shows that it takes a long time to 
build the structural and cultural foundations for overcoming the 
CPR problems inherent in ﬁ scal decisions. Once established, such 
foundations need to be continuously maintained by all key stake-
holders in the community—oﬃ  cials, labor, civic organizations, and 
 Table 1 Matching and Mismatching Ostrom’s Six Micro-Situational Variables
Micro-situational variables Los Angeles County San Bernardino City San Bernardino County
Communication is feasible 
with the full set of 
 participants
Open and structured communications 
among elected offi cials, admin-
istrators, and stakeholders in the 
broader community 
Few open communications between the city 
attorney and mayor/council; the broader 
community of stakeholders is seldom 
involved in budgetary communications
Efforts to enhance communications across 
departments and districts and among stake-
holders in the region
Reputations of participants 
are known
Good working relationships between 
the board and the CEO; trust 
between partnering organizations, 
including the unions
Key stakeholders (including the city attorney 
and public safety unions) are known for 
their uncompromising stances in protecting 
their vested interests
A new majority in the board, working with a 
reputable chief executive, began to demon-
strate a commitment to developing honest 
and responsible budgetary decisions
High marginal per capita 
return for participants 
in successful collective 
efforts
The budgetary process and person-
nel policy link performance and 
effi ciencies to budgetary allocations 
in different departments
Public safety offi cers’ salaries and benefi ts 
are guaranteed by the charter; they do not 
see any high return for working with other 
stakeholders
A new budgetary system was put in place 
that rewarded departments for sound fi scal 
planning and decisions
Entry or exit capabilities for 
key participants so that 
no one will be taken for 
granted
Seasoned public management 
professionals engage the board on 
budgetary issues without fear
Given the deep divisions among elected of-
fi cials, executives do not enjoy the security 
needed to lead credibly an orderly budget-
ary process
A strong professional reputation and a fi ve-
year employment contract allowed him to 
carry out his reform agenda without fear
Longer time horizon Supervisors have long tenure and are 
willing to plan for the long term; the 
long-term viability of the pension 
system encourages employees to ac-
cept compromises in benefi t cuts
The city attorney has long tenure, while other 
elected offi cials are subject to term limits; 
they have different agendas; the long-
serving city attorney has the public safety 
unions as his major source of support
Supervisors are subject to term limits, and 
the chief executive offi cer has a fi ve-year 
contract with supermajority protection; a 
10-year expenditure forecast requirement 
has been built into the budgetary process
Agreed-upon sanctioning 
capabilities
Shared commitment to the long term 
by all major stakeholders; depart-
ment heads face tangible sanctions 
(both formal and informal) for sub-
mitting infl ated budgetary requests
Mistrust between elected offi cials and en-
trenched positions of pubic safety unions 
make it diffi cult for them to reach credible 
compromises and enforce them
A more transparent and inclusive budgetary 
process has been taking shape; elected of-
fi cials and department heads have become 
more likely to face sanctions for infl ated 
budgetary requests
To foster changes, sustained 
eﬀ orts are needed to involve 
stakeholders and build the 
process and stable expectations 
among stakeholders for recon-
ciling their short- and long-term 
interests in budgeting decisions.
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with city government suggests the absence 
of a high rate of return for cooperation. In 
San Bernardino County, the new ﬁ nance 
and budgeting system put in place by 
the new chief executive oﬃ  cer began to 
show department administrators that their 
departments would be rewarded for sound 
ﬁ scal planning and decisions. Th e stra-
tegic planning process has begun to identify ways to partner with 
nonproﬁ ts and other governments to attain more eﬃ  cient uses of 
resources.
Entry or Exit Capabilities for Key Participants So That No One 
Can Be Taken for Granted
In Los Angeles County, the professional expertise of staﬀ , includ-
ing the chief administrator, provides professional options beyond 
county employment. Th e exit option of key participants provides 
a level playing ﬁ eld in discussions between elected and appointed 
staﬀ . In San Bernardino City, as a result of the deep divisions 
among elected leaders, appointed executives do not enjoy the 
security needed to lead credibly an orderly budgetary process. 
In San Bernardino County, the new chief executive oﬃ  cer has a 
strong professional reputation and was able to negotiate a ﬁ ve-year 
employment contract, which allowed him to carry out his reform 
agenda with long-term credibility.
Longer Time Horizon
In Los Angeles County, supervisors have usually had long tenure, 
including one serving for 40 years, but they are still subject to 
potential electoral challenges, especially if major budgetary crises 
emerge. A combination of long tenures and lessons learned from 
the Orange County bankruptcy created pressure for the supervisors 
to consider the long-term impact of annual budget decisions. An 
understanding emerged that if they sacriﬁ ce the long term to deal 
with short-time problems, they are likely to be the ones who have 
to deal with the consequences in years to come. Employees’ belief 
in the long-term viability of the county’s pension system encour-
ages them to accept compromises to beneﬁ t cuts. In San Bernardino 
City, major elected oﬃ  cials were elected at diﬀ erent times and 
have diﬀ erent expectations about the duration of their tenure. 
Th e council members are subject to term limits. Th e long-serving 
city attorney is not subject to term limits and appeared to have a 
diﬀ erent agenda from those of other elected oﬃ  cials and admin-
istrators. Th ere were no mechanisms in place for elected council 
members or city administrators to account for the long-term impact 
of negotiated labor agreements or annual budget decisions. In San 
Bernardino County, the 10-year expenditure forecast requirement 
has been built into the current budgetary process. It remains to be 
seen whether future supervisors and chief executives will continue to 
support the new budgetary process.
Agreed-Upon Sanctioning Capabilities
In Los Angeles County, internally, with the development of a system 
of integrated information ﬂ ows, a strategic planning process involv-
ing all key departments, and a shared commitment to a long-term 
view, department heads face tangible sanctions (both formal and 
informal) for submitting inﬂ ated budgetary requests. Externally, by 
relying on the bond market and bond rating system for short-term 
borrowing (e.g., tax anticipation notes and revenue anticipation 
Communication Is Feasible with the Full Set 
of Participants
Los Angeles County has been able to develop 
and sustain a transparent budgetary process that 
facilitates open communication among depart-
ment heads, the chief administrator/executive, 
and the board of supervisors. Budget discussions 
also include communications with stakehold-
ers and networks of partnerships across the county. Th e case shows 
that communication with the public is important, but it needs to 
be structured in ways that facilitate thoughtful deliberation and 
analysis. In a large and politically diverse county like Los Angeles, it 
is important to not politicize every budgetary decision; freewheeling 
leaks to the press can be counterproductive. In San Bernardino City, 
there are few open communications between the city attorney and 
mayor/council. Even at the meeting declaring bankruptcy, the city 
attorney disagreed with council members on the city’s ﬁ scal condi-
tion. Th e broader community of stakeholders is seldom involved in 
budgetary communications. In San Bernardino County, eﬀ orts were 
made to enhance communications across departments and supervi-
sory districts in the county and among relevant stakeholders in the 
entire region.
Reputations of Participants Are Known
Los Angeles County’s reputation for conservative budgeting facili-
tates negotiation with unions regarding pension issues, as the unions 
can have conﬁ dence that short-term sacriﬁ ces by their members 
will be reliably compensated in the future. Th e known reputations 
reduce uncertainty and create incentives for considering long-term 
ﬁ scal impacts, as well as for building trust. Good working relation-
ships between the board and the chief administrator/executive also 
facilitate negotiation with the unions. Partnering organizations 
throughout the county know that sound ﬁ scal decisions are consist-
ently made, building trust among stakeholders throughout the 
county. In San Bernardino City, the reputations of long-standing 
participants actually worked against addressing the ﬁ scal crisis. 
Reputations of key stakeholders are known, but only for the uncom-
promising stance they take in protecting their vested interests, as in 
the case of the public safety unions. In San Bernardino County, the 
new majority on the board has begun to demonstrate a commit-
ment to developing an administrative structure and budgetary proc-
ess that facilitates responsible budgetary decisions on behalf of the 
county as a whole, enhancing the members’ reputations. Th e board 
chair and newly hired CEO had known reputations for responsible 
budgeting and strategic successes in their respective roles prior to 
taking their county positions.
High Marginal Per Capita Return for Participants in Successful 
Collective Efforts
In Los Angeles, supervisors are concerned about the political 
repercussions of major budgetary crises, but such concerns may 
not necessarily translate into concerted eﬀ orts unless other condi-
tions for sustainable cooperation exist. Th e budgetary process and 
personnel policy link performance and eﬃ  ciencies to budgetary 
allocation and rewards for employees in diﬀ erent departments. In 
San Bernardino City, the charter guarantees public safety oﬃ  cers’ 
salaries and retirement beneﬁ ts; as a result, they do not see any high 
return for cooperating with other stakeholders to address budget-
ary shortfalls. Th e absence of a robust civic infrastructure engaged 
Th e absence of a robust civic 
infrastructure engaged with 
city government suggests the 
absence of a high rate of return 
for cooperation.
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ultimately, they all need to be convinced to support ﬁ scal decisions 
that may be disadvantageous for them in the short run but are 
beneﬁ cial to them and to the entire community in the long run. 
Interactive dynamics that foster trust and reciprocity are the founda-
tion for successful collective action among these diverse actors in the 
community (Robertson and Tang 1995; Tang and Tang 2014).
In addition to the micro-situational variables, individuals coping 
with CPR dilemmas are also aﬀ ected by a broader set of contextual 
variables related to the underlying institutional environments. After 
decades of research about the impact of institutional rules on CPR 
management, Ostrom came to the conclusion that speciﬁ c rules 
associated with success or failure vary across diﬀ erent contexts, and 
it will be futile to try to pinpoint speciﬁ c rules that are infallibly 
associated with successful cases (Ostrom 2010, 652). Instead, a 
more viable approach is to move up a level of generality by focus-
ing on the broad “design principles” that may inform choices of 
institutional rules under diverse circumstances. Yet, as pointed out 
by Cox, Arnold, and Tomas (2010) and acknowledged by Ostrom, 
design principles may also risk being treated by practitioners as 
rigid blueprints for imposing uniform institutional rules on diverse 
settings. To counteract such possible misunderstandings, Ostrom 
proposes that “one can translate the design principles into a series 
of questions that could be asked when thinking about improv-
ing the sustainability of a common-pool resource system” (2005, 
271). Th us, we examine next how the three cases may help answer 
Ostrom’s questions on institutional design.
1. Well-deﬁ ned boundaries. “How can we better deﬁ ne the bound-
aries of this resource, and of the individuals who are using it, so as 
to make clear who is authorized to harvest and where harvesting is 
authorized?” (Ostrom 2005, 271). A critical 
issue regarding the ﬁ scal commons is not just 
who has a share of the revenue pool but also 
who has control (or entitlement) over which 
portion of it. In Los Angeles County, the 
board of supervisors, working with the chief 
executive, maintained control of the entire 
budget, allowing it the ﬂ exibility to make 
adjustments to expenditures according to pro-
jections on revenues and needs of the county. 
Th e arrangement also enabled the board and the chief executive to 
negotiate credibly with diﬀ erent stakeholders in the county when 
making those adjustments. In San Bernardino City, the city charter 
guaranteed public safety oﬃ  cers automatic raises based on formu-
lae that are incompatible with the local economic reality. Th ese 
guaranteed entitlements created major diﬃ  culties, especially during 
economic downturns, for adjusting expenditures according to avail-
able revenue streams. San Bernardino County had a long tradition 
of allocating ﬁ nancial resources along district boundaries; this tradi-
tion created incentives for each supervisor to focus on protecting 
the ﬁ scal share for his or her district while neglecting priority setting 
across districts. One strategy adopted to turn around the county’s 
ﬁ scal condition has been to break down this “silo” arrangement by 
giving the CEO’s oﬃ  ce greater authority in setting priorities across 
departments and geographic districts.
2. Proportional equivalence between beneﬁ ts and costs. “How 
can we clarify the relationship between the beneﬁ ts received and the 
notes) and long-term borrowing, county supervisors face eﬀ ective 
constraints on overextending ﬁ scal resources. In addition, the statu-
tory requirements for reporting created a regular transparency to 
the board, to professional staﬀ , and to the bond market that served 
as sanctions against overappropriations. In San Bernardino City, 
mistrust between key elected oﬃ  cials makes it diﬃ  cult for them to 
reach credible compromises and enforce them. Entrenched positions 
of the public safety unions also make it diﬃ  cult to reach and enforce 
deals to maintain the city’s long-term ﬁ nancial health. No eﬀ ective 
community-based civic groups exist to hold city oﬃ  cials account-
able for their ﬁ scal mistakes. In San Bernardino County, the new 
budgetary process has become more transparent and involves par-
ticipation from a wide variety of actors from both inside and outside 
the county government. Elected oﬃ  cials and department heads 
are now more likely to face both formal and informal sanctions for 
inﬂ ated budgetary requests.
Th is three-case comparison, by itself, cannot ascertain Ostrom’s six 
micro-situational variables as either necessary or suﬃ  cient condi-
tions for successful resolution of CPR dilemmas. Yet these six 
variables can serve as useful heuristics for identifying the relevant 
interactive dynamics among stakeholders in local ﬁ scal governance 
situations, with Los Angeles illustrating a best-case scenario in con-
trast to the dismal situation in San Bernardino City, and the case of 
San Bernardino County illustrating possible strategies for reshaping 
interactive dynamics to avert potential ﬁ scal disasters. Overall, the 
cases show that the interactive dynamics between elected oﬃ  cials 
and senior appointed staﬀ s are always the key. Th ey need not have 
identical interests, but their willingness to work with each other 
is a critical precondition for success. Reputable and professional 
chief executives play an important role in leading and maintaining 
a budgetary process that takes into account a 
broad range of interests in the entire com-
munity from a long-term perspective. To be 
successful, executives have to be empowered 
by the elected oﬃ  cials to present the juris-
diction’s ﬁ scal realities, both short and long 
term, regardless of political consequences. A 
transparent and forward-looking budgetary 
process is also essential for encouraging all 
stakeholders in the community to consider 
the long term when making ﬁ scal decisions. For public administra-
tion professionals who are fortunate to be working in a jurisdiction 
in which all the favorable micro-situational conditions are in place, 
their main task would be to make sure that those conditions and 
arrangements are properly maintained. If not, the critical task is to 
identify what is lacking and what can be done to reframe the collec-
tive action dynamics among key stakeholders in the community.
Most important, this micro-situational perspective helps analysts 
and practitioners understand government ﬁ scal decisions as more 
than simply static or internal budgetary control problems, but as 
dynamic processes requiring coordinated eﬀ orts among a multitude 
of actors in the local community and including at least elected 
representatives, appointed executives, career civil servants, union 
leaders, community leaders, and the public (Wang et al. 2012). Th e 
micro-situational perspective identiﬁ es that context matters, but 
that context is not immutable. Diﬀ erent actors all have their respec-
tive roles and sources of inﬂ uence within the local jurisdiction; 
A critical issue regarding the 
ﬁ scal commons is not just 
who has a share of the revenue 
pool but also who has control 
(or entitlement) over which 
portion of it.
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which was plagued by dysfunctional conﬂ icts among elected oﬃ  -
cials. A new majority in the San Bernardino County board allowed 
for the hiring of a professional executive to take steps to correct past 
ﬁ scal mistakes, but the long-term prospect for success hinges on 
whether future council members will continue to be motivated to 
work with each other to monitor the ﬁ scal commons.
5. Graduated sanctions. “What are the sanctions we are author-
izing and can they be adjusted so that someone who makes an 
error or a small rule infraction is suﬃ  ciently warned so as to ensure 
longer-term compliance without our trying to impose unrealistic 
sanctions?” (Ostrom 2005, 271). Th ere are at least two related 
questions here. One concerns potential sanctions for elected oﬃ  cials 
making irresponsible ﬁ scal decisions, and the other concerns disci-
pline imposed on career oﬃ  cials. In Los Angeles County, supervi-
sors usually had long tenure, but they were still subject to potential 
electoral challenges. Because the county also had a large portfolio of 
bond issues, ﬁ nancial missteps could easily trigger punitive actions 
by the ﬁ nancial market. County supervisors were well aware of the 
long-term headache they had to suﬀ er by making ﬁ scal mistakes. 
Being empowered by the board, the chief executive was able to 
develop and sustain a budgetary process in which department heads 
faced tangible sanctions (both formal and informal) for submitting 
inﬂ ated budgetary requests. In San Bernardino City, mistrust among 
entrenched elected oﬃ  cials made it diﬃ  cult for them to reach cred-
ible compromises and enforce them. Th ere were no strong elector-
ate and civic community to hold the elected oﬃ  cials accountable 
for their ﬁ nancial mistakes. With their ﬁ nancial interests protected 
by the charter, public safety oﬃ  cials faced little risk in resisting 
demands for ﬁ nancial concessions. In San Bernardino County, there 
have been known corrupt practices among elected and nonelected 
oﬃ  cials, indicating lapses in the county’s political accountability 
system. Yet a new majority of the board provided the impetus for 
hiring a new chief executive who tried to put in place a budgetary 
process that sanctioned against inﬂ ated budgetary requests from 
both elected oﬃ  cials and department heads.
6. Conﬂ ict-resolution mechanisms. “What local and regional 
mechanisms exist to resolve conﬂ icts arising over the use of this 
resource?” (Ostrom 2005, 271). In a local jurisdiction, the elected 
council/board is ultimately the arena in which conﬂ icts over the ﬁ s-
cal commons are resolved. In this regard, an open, deliberative, and 
accountable council/board is important. But many ﬁ nancial con-
ﬂ icts cannot be resolved simply by a majority vote in the council/
board. For example, whether employee unions are willing to accept 
cutbacks to their salaries and beneﬁ ts often depends on whether the 
elected oﬃ  cials and chief executives are known to have good work-
ing relationships and whether they can be trusted to conduct good-
faith negotiations and to keep promises made in those negotiations. 
Apparently, these kinds of conﬂ ict resolution mechanisms were well 
in place in Los Angeles City but not in San Bernardino City, while 
San Bernardino County was in the process of strengthening such 
mechanisms.
7. Minimal recognition of rights. “Are there functional or creative 
eﬀ orts by local appropriators to craft eﬀ ective stewardship mecha-
nisms for local resources that should be recognized?” (Ostrom 2005, 
271). As mentioned earlier, the state of California has a long tradi-
tion of supporting self-governance of local jurisdictions. At least for 
contributions to the costs of sustaining this system?” (Ostrom 2005, 
271). In sizable local jurisdictions, the ﬁ scal commons is huge, 
involving billions of dollars in annual revenues and expenditures. 
In order to convince all stakeholders to contribute to sustaining the 
ﬁ scal commons, credible information is needed to help stakehold-
ers understand realistic revenue projections and competing priori-
ties. Los Angeles County beneﬁ ted from a transparent budgetary 
process that was based on a single point of coordination, consistent 
ﬂ ow of information across departments, and the board of supervi-
sors’ regular involvement in considering relevant information and 
options. San Bernardino City, in contrast, showed a total absence of 
transparency and collaboration among key institutional actors in its 
budgetary process, epitomized by the July 2012 council meeting in 
which the city attorney and the mayor accused each other for not 
knowing the city’s true ﬁ nancial condition. Th e turnaround eﬀ ort in 
San Bernardino County was premised on developing an integrated 
ﬁ nancial tracking system across all departments, with a 10-year 
expenditure forecast in each budget presented to the board.
3. Collective choice arrangements. “How can we enhance the par-
ticipation of those involved in making key decisions about this sys-
tem?” (Ostrom 2005, 271). Th ere are many potential stakeholders 
for the ﬁ scal commons; a structured and orderly process is needed to 
aggregate inputs and consider options. In Los Angeles County, long-
serving supervisors had a long-term view about the county and were 
willing to work closely with the chief executive in making tough 
ﬁ nancial decisions on a regular basis. Th ere was open communica-
tion among board members, the chief executive, and department 
heads; budgetary discussions regularly included communications 
with stakeholders and networks of partnerships across the county. In 
San Bernardino City, deep-rooted conﬂ icts among the city attor-
ney, mayor, and council members precluded open communication 
and orderly participation among key decision makers in the city. A 
largely disenfranchised electorate also failed to hold these key deci-
sion makers accountable for their ﬁ scal mistakes. In San Bernardino 
County, part of the turnaround strategy included strategic planning 
processes involving county oﬃ  cials, city oﬃ  cials, civic leaders, and 
regional planning agency oﬃ  cials. Hired on a ﬁ ve-year employment 
contract and protected by a supermajority in the council, the new 
CEO was empowered to build on a broad-based strategic planning 
initiative and to develop a more structured way for department 
heads to participate in budgetary processes.
4. Monitoring. “Who is monitoring this system and do they face 
appropriate incentives given the challenge of monitoring?” (Ostrom 
2005, 271). In the context of California, where local self-governance 
is a valued tradition, the democratically elected council/board 
bears the ultimate responsibility for monitoring the ﬁ scal com-
mons within its jurisdiction. Members of the council/board do not 
have to share the same preferences and priorities, but they need to 
be willing to acquire ﬁ scal ﬂ uency and to work with each other in 
upholding their ﬁ duciary responsibilities. Th ey are more likely to be 
willing to do so if they expect to serve the jurisdiction for the long 
term and the local electorate and other watchdog groups are active 
in holding the elected representatives accountable. To be an eﬀ ective 
ﬁ nancial monitor, the council/board members need to be supported 
by professional managers who are willing to serve the council/board 
with integrity and without fear. Th ese conditions are largely fulﬁ lled 
in Los Angeles County but mostly missing in San Bernardino City, 
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elected oﬃ  cials and professional managers for 
making ﬁ scal mistakes. A key to ﬁ scal sustain-
ability is to draw on sound design principles 
(but not rigid blueprints) to develop a set of 
self-enforcing institutions and organizational 
practices in which participants are motivated 
to help support the same rules that constrain 
their claims on the common revenue pool, with an understanding 
that doing so will be in their long-term interest (Greif 2006; Tang 
2012).
Conclusion
By viewing local government ﬁ scal sustainability as a CPR problem, 
this article has examined a set of micro-situational variables that 
explain the success or failure of participants in developing the trust 
and reciprocity needed to overcome the social dilemmas inherent 
in many ﬁ scal and budgetary decisions. Our analysis shows that 
the six micro-situational variables can serve as useful heuristics for 
analyzing how diﬀ erent interactive dynamics may lead to successful 
or failure in managing the local ﬁ scal com-
mons. Th e analysis also shows the importance 
of seeing local ﬁ scal decisions not just as 
internal budgetary control issues but also as 
collective action problems among a diverse 
set of stakeholders. Institutional designs that 
facilitate transparency, coordinated eﬀ orts, 
accountability, and conﬂ ict resolution among 
diverse stakeholders are key to resolving ﬁ scal 
commons dilemmas.
Th is article contributes to the CPR literature by showing a new 
approach to in-depth case comparison that links two sets of 
context—micro-situational variables and design principles—into 
a consolidated diagnostic analysis (Cox, Arnold, and Tomas 2010; 
Young 2002). Th e article can also be seen as a ﬁ rst step toward 
developing a comprehensive research agenda for studying ﬁ scal 
sustainability issues from a CPR perspective. Chapman (2008), for 
example, outlines a number of possible revenue, expenditure, and 
administrative “solutions” to ﬁ scal sustainability challenges faced 
by state and local governments. Logical next steps in Chapman’s 
analysis would be to deﬁ ne more precisely the diﬀ erent types of 
CPR problems related to these revenue, expenditure, and admin-
istrative “solutions,” to develop a more systematic method of 
identifying cases that face similar types of CPR problems, and 
to examine how variations in context aﬀ ect the relevant micro-
situational variables. In addition, the tension of the electorate 
(Korey 2011), with higher expectations for services (i.e., increased 
demand) while simultaneously wanting reduced property, sales, 
and other taxes (i.e., decreased supply), needs to be researched 
in the context of the CPR framework. Th e best practices identi-
ﬁ ed in these and related cases (Pisano and Callahan 2013a) need 
to be tested within the CPR framework across a wide range of 
jurisdictions.
Fiscal sustainability will remain an ongoing topic, with the projected 
“ﬁ scal gap” faced by local jurisdictions continuing to widen in the 
coming decades (GAO 2013; Goldberg and Neiman 2014; Pisano 
2013). Closing the gap will require some combination of expenditure 
reduction, revenue increase, and, more important, modiﬁ cations of 
the three jurisdictions covered in this study, 
state recognition of rights for crafting steward-
ship mechanisms for the local ﬁ scal commons 
appears to be well established. In recent years, 
however, there have been attempts by the 
state government to implement statewide 
policy reform, such as the elimination of local 
redevelopment agencies, which may have long-term negative ﬁ scal 
impacts on local jurisdictions. Th ese issues are beyond the scope of 
this article, but one may note that it is not necessarily a lack of rec-
ognition of rights but actions by higher-level governments that may 
create additional stresses on the local ﬁ scal commons and would test 
local jurisdictions’ capacity for handling them.
8. Nested enterprise. “How can we create a multi-layer, polyc-
entric system that can be dynamic, adaptive, and eﬀ ective over 
time?” (Ostrom 2005, 271). In governing the local ﬁ scal commons, 
the budgetary process is the focal point for collaboration among 
stakeholders. Yet as illustrated in the three cases, the budgetary 
system does not operate in isolation. To be an 
eﬀ ective tool for ﬁ scal sustainability, the budg-
etary process must be nested within a political 
environment in which elected oﬃ  cials, none-
lected oﬃ  cials, civic leaders, and the electorate 
all contribute to supporting transparency, 
accountability, and collaboration.
Seen from the ﬁ ndings corresponding to these 
eight questions, it is apparent that none of the 
three usual factors discussed in the public ﬁ nance literature—ex ante 
ﬁ scal rules, electoral rules, the budget process—can fully explain 
by itself the conditions for ﬁ scal sustainability. Many endogenous 
factors are in play. For example, a city charter in San Bernardino 
City that guarantees salary raises for public safety employees does 
not make sense from the perspective of responsible budgeting, but 
the adoption of such a charter provision reﬂ ects the city’s underlying 
politics. Fiscal sustainability is ultimately premised on local political 
processes that encourage stakeholders to look beyond their immedi-
ate self-interests and to support ﬁ scal decisions that protect their 
own long-term interests as well as the long-term well-being of the 
community.
Sound design principles for deﬁ ning ﬁ scal decision rights, infor-
mation availability, monitoring, sanctioning, collective choice, 
and conﬂ ict resolution mechanisms can guide the development of 
appropriate institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, 
that ﬁ t the particular circumstances of a local jurisdiction. A well-
coordinated budgetary process is essential for avoiding commons 
dilemmas in ﬁ scal decision making. Yet such a budgetary process 
is not viable unless it is supported by other related transactions 
in the community that reinforce mutual expectations for trust 
and reciprocity among all the key stakeholders. As shown in our 
analysis, it is important that the elected council maintains control of 
the entire budget and empowers professional managers to negoti-
ate credibly with diﬀ erent stakeholders; credible information with 
realistic revenue and expenditure projections is made available to all 
stakeholders; there is a transparent budgetary process with a coor-
dinated and consistent ﬂ ow of information across departments and 
stakeholder groups; and established mechanisms exist to sanction 
In governing the local  ﬁ scal 
commons, the budgetary 
 process is the focal point for col-
laboration among stakeholders.
Institutional designs that facili-
tate transparency, coordinated 
eﬀ orts, accountability, and con-
ﬂ ict resolution among diverse 
stakeholders are key to resolving 
ﬁ scal commons dilemmas.
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institutional design informed by research. Th e example in the CPR 
literature of a groundwater basin facing the prospect of ruin because 
of overpumping or insuﬃ  cient replenishment (Blomquist 1992) pro-
vides a cautionary metaphor for understanding the dynamics leading 
to depletion of ﬁ scal resources. Understanding the collective action 
challenges inherent in CPR governance will be a key to attaining 
 ﬁ scal sustainability in the coming decades.
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Note
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